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venientes del campo de las Ciencias Cognitivas, y de usarlas en defensa del argumento 
central del libro.
También es muy de agradecer el esfuerzo hecho por los autores por desarrollar una filo-
sofía de la ciencia historicista que no renuncie de entrada a dar cuenta de la estructura nor-
mativa de la ciencia. Su estrategia de localizar dicha estructura en las normas implícitas en 
las diversas prácticas que conforman el quehacer científico resulta atractiva, además, por 
cuanto da una respuesta clara a la cuestión del origen de la normatividad de la ciencia.
Se echan de menos, si acaso, más detalles acerca de las soluciones ofrecidas en los capí-
tulos seis, siete y ocho a los problemas de la unidad de la ciencia, de la abstracción y del cam-
bio científico. Aunque las soluciones ofrecidas a estos tres problemas resultan atractivas en 
sí mismas, en ocasiones no está del todo claro la forma en que éstas se siguen de las defini-
ciones de práctica y de heurística ofrecidas en los capítulos cuatro y cinco. En ocasiones no 
queda claro, en otras palabras, cuál es el papel exacto que los detalles del marco teórico de-
sarrollado en la primera parte del libro juegan a la hora de sustentar las soluciones ofrecidas 
en los tres últimos capítulos.
En cualquier caso, la propuesta ofrecida por Sergio Martínez y Xiang Huang resulta muy 
digna de estima no sólo por las conclusiones que se alcanzan en el libro, sino también por las 
muchas otras direcciones en las que este enfoque podría extenderse. La filosofía de la cien-
cia centrada en prácticas desarrollada por los autores, en efecto, proporciona un marco teó-
rico que promete ser extremadamente fértil en su aplicación a problemas filosóficos de toda 
índole. En este sentido, sería de especial interés aplicar la noción de práctica ofrecida por los 
autores para dar cuenta de la naturaleza del teorizar científico y, en última instancia, de la na-
turaleza del conocimiento teórico. Es una virtud de este concepto de práctica, ciertamente, el 
ser lo suficientemente flexible como para poder acometer este tipo de reto.
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In recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have argued that the key to under-
standing life lies in understanding its organisation; that living organisms must be studied 
as whole systems rather than as a decomposed collection of mechanistic parts. But what 
defines biological organisation? How is it distinguished from the organisation of simpler 
physical systems? How does it relate to complex psychological systems? Mossio & Moreno’s 
2015 book, Biological Autonomy, is a sustained and thorough attempt to answer these ques-
tions. The book surmises, synthesizes and elaborates on the work of a number of philoso-
phers, including Barandiaran, Bich, Etxeberria, Juarrero, Montevil, Moreno, Mossio, Ruiz-
Mirazo, Saborido and Umerez; many of whom have been working in collaboration for 
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upwards of twenty years. Biological Autonomy provides a snapshot of the ideas which have 
emerged out of these collaborations.
The book is described as both a theoretical and philosophical enquiry. On the theoreti-
cal side, insights are synthesized from a number of theoretical biologists including Matu-
rana & Varela, Kauffman, Pattee, Ganti and Rosen; and links are drawn to other contem-
porary accounts of biological autonomy, most notably the account developed by Hooker, 
Christensen & Bickhard. As a result, many of the ideas are not entirely new, but their syn-
thesis provides the reader with a useful introduction to the various milestones which have 
shaped current organisational theories. The novel contributions of the book center around 
the clarification of various concepts, most notably closure and constraint; the identifica-
tion of two distinct dimensions of biological autonomy - the constitutive and the interac-
tive; and the demonstration of how these concepts can be usefully applied to various types 
of biological phenomena; including single-cellular and multi-cellular organisms, ecosys-
tems, lineages and cognition. Philosophically, Mossio & Moreno then endeavour to show 
how their theory of biological organisation as a closure of constraints can inform tradi-
tional philosophical issues, such as the nature of biological causation and functions. In this 
review, we provide a brief overview of their theoretical contributions and some discussion 
of Mossio & Moreno’s claim that biological organisation can naturalise the normative and 
teleological dimensions of biological functions.
Biological organisation as a closure of constraints
The core ambition of Biological Autonomy is to provide an account of the organisation 
of biological systems, elucidating how it differs from the organisation of other physical sys-
tems. At the heart of Mossio & Moreno’s project lies an appeal to the closed causal struc-
ture of biological systems, which they characterize as self-determining. This structure forms 
between entities, defined not by their physical characteristics but by their role in a sys-
tem. Specifically, it is claimed, these entities play a constraining role. To understand what 
is meant by the term constraint, Mossio & Moreno offer the example of a ball sitting on a 
sloping plane (5). The slope of the plane acts as a boundary condition constraining the pos-
sible dynamics of the ball that rests on it. The slope of the plane is not, however, changed 
by the way the ball rolls across its surface. Which is to say, what the ball does is dependent 
on the slope but what the slope does is not dependent on the ball. There is a one-way de-
pendency relation. In this example, the slope is a constraint and the ball is not. In a biologi-
cal system, the relations between constituents are much more complex. Specifically, entities 
in biological systems are mutually dependent. This does not mean that every component of 
a biological system will directly constrain the activity of every other component in the bio-
logical system. But it requires that every component of a biological system engage in at least 
two dependency relations. In one of those relations, another component of the biological 
system must be dependent on it. Which is to say it must play the role of a constraint. In the 
second of those relations, it must be dependent on another biological component. Which is 
to say, it must be constrained. The nature of dependency is also different between physical 
and biological systems. While the dynamics of the ball might depend on the slope, its exist-
ence does not. By contrast, constraints in biological systems are dependent on each other for 
their generation and regeneration. In identifying all of the components that fit these crite-
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ria, you identify the components of a biological system. In this way, M ossio & Moreno’s 
theory of biological organisation as a closure of constraints also offers a theory of biological 
individuation.
Constitutive and interactive biological autonomy
Having provided a theory of biological organisation as a closure of constraints, Mossio & 
Moreno then turn to the question of biological autonomy, arguing that it is comprised 
of two dimensions. The first constitutive dimension requires that the system be a caus-
ally closed system. It emphasizes the fact that all biological systems are dissipative systems. 
Like all dissipative systems, their parts tend to decay over time and must be continuously 
regenerated if they are to continue to exist. In order to maintain the organisation of which 
they are part and on which they depend, constraints harness energy and matter from the 
thermodynamic flow that surrounds them and channel it into the regeneration of the or-
ganisation. The second interactive dimension emphasizes the way biological systems inter-
act with their environments in order to promote their own maintenance.
Naturalising biological functions
One of the core philosophical claims of Biological Autonomy is that the constitutive dimen-
sion of biological autonomy can naturalise function ascriptions. Specifically, Mossio & 
Moreno claim to show that although ‘functional statements cannot be reduced to ordinary 
causal ones, they are compatible with the structure of scientific discourse’ (64). They ap-
proach the problem by conceptually decomposing functions into three dimensions —teleo-
logical, normative and organisational— and arguing that these dimensions can be grounded 
in the closure of constraints which defines the constitutive dimension of biological systems. 
More formally, they claim that functions must satisfy three jointly necessary and sufficient 
conditions: ‘a trait T has a function if and only if:
C1. T exerts a constraint that contributes to the maintenance of the organisation O;
C2. T is maintained under some constraints of O;
C3. O realizes closure’ (73).
The crux of their approach thus lies in an appeal to the mutual dependency relations 
which define biological systems: the trait causes an effect which contributes to the main-
tenance of the organisation O; in turn, the trait is maintained by O. The emphasis is on a 
causal loop: ‘Asked why we have hearts, we can legitimately answer because they pump blood 
given that ‘the heart is there because it pumps blood (otherwise the organism, and thus the 
heart, would disappear), and pumping blood is a consequence of the heart’s being there’ 
(Mossio & Moreno, 73). To put it bluntly, if the heart stopped pumping blood, the organ-
ism would very quickly cease to exist, and so too would the heart itself. In this sense, it is 
correct to say that I have a heart because it pumps blood.
One of the curious things about their account is that while Mossio & Moreno claim 
functions are teleological, normative and organisational, the three conditions they identify 
are not markedly normative. From the get-go, then, if the ambition is to provide an account 
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of functions which is irreducibly normative, it seems hard to see how this will be achieved. 
And yet, Mossio & Moreno do claim to have naturalised normativity. Specifically, they 
claim that:
self-maintenance grounds normativity. The activity of a self-maintaining system has an intrin-
sic relevance for itself, to the extent that its very existence depends on the constraints exerted 
through its own activity. Such intrinsic relevance generates a naturalised criterion for determin-
ing what norms the system is supposed to follow: the system must behave in a specific way, other-
wise it would cease to exist (71).
The first problem with this account is the ambiguity assigned to words such as supposed and 
must. The gist of the approach seems to rest on a claim that biological systems must main-
tain their conditions of existence or they will cease to exist. But stated as such, the term 
must doesn’t demand a normative interpretation at all. What seems to be meant is that if 
a system does not behave in a certain way, it will cease to exist. That is, we are simply deal-
ing with a statement of fact about biological systems. But based on this, Mossio & Moreno 
claim we can identify what the system is supposed to do. To make this jump from facts to 
norms, they appeal to the notion of intrinsic relevance.
This brings us to the second criticism which Mossio & Moreno’s account of normative 
functions seems vulnerable to. Mossio & Moreno assert that the activity of a self-maintain-
ing system has an intrinsic relevance for itself, but only to the extent that its own existence 
depends on that activity. But this suggests that what is actually relevant to the system is its 
existence and this raises a sleuth of questions. Does this assume that living systems have an 
interest in maintaining their existence? Does it require the additional assumption that ex-
istence is in some way valuable or good? Can this be justified by appealing to the constitu-
tive organisation of the system?
In sum, it seems to us that Mossio & Moreno’s account of normative functions would 
benefit from work in two directions. First, the relationship between the normative and tel-
eological aspects of biological functions could be made clearer. Second, the type of norma-
tivity at stake could use some clarification. Yet despite these challenges, or possibly because 
of them, Biological Autonomy is a must-read book for any philosopher interested in the de-
bate on biological functions. There is no doubt that the ideas contained within will shape 
the direction of debate for years to come. The same can be said for any philosopher inter-
ested in the nature of biological organisation, autonomy, individuation and causation.
Louisa Jane Holt
University of Copenhagen 
qdv361@hum.ku.dk
Sune Holm
University of Copenhagen 
suneh@hum.ku.dk
BIBLID 0495-4548(2017)32:3p.392-395 
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.18066
